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The effectiveness and desirability of various forms of punishment are the subject of a great deal
of current debate in the field of criminology. Crucial to a proper solution of the problems in this
area is an adequate appraisal of the offender's attitude toward punishment. In this article, Dr.
Schmideberg states that a badly distorted conception of the offender's feelings in this respect is
widespread today. In presenting her own appraisal of the offender's attitude toward and reaction
to punishment, she calls for a reexamination of contemporary thought concerning such matters as
"free will" and responsibility, and the idea that criminals harbor an unconscious desire for punish-
ment.-EDiTOR.
Ever since the eighteenth century, there has
been a powerful movement to humanize justice.
This movement has succeeded in abolishing torture
and public executions, in limiting the death
penalty, in improving conditions in prison, in
abolishing the imprisonment of children, in
establishing probation and parole, and, generally,
in aiming at rehabilitation rather than retaliation.'
Hand in hand with these efforts has been the
trend to restrict or eliminate punishment and
discipline in the raising of children, dating back
to the days of Rousseau and Pestalozzi and culmi-
nating in present-day progressive education with
its ideals of permissiveness and non-punitiveness.
There is still undue harshness and injustice in
certain areas of correction, but in other areas the
trend to improve the lot of criminals has already
gone too far, and in any case the issue has become
so emotionalized and cliche-ridden that it is high
time to re-examine and restate some of the funda-
mentals.
It has been rightly argued that brutal punish-
ments brutalize the community, and that a
democracy should not become a police state;
often, however, insufficient consideration is given
to the victim of a crime. It has been said that
states that have no death penalty have a lower
'PLAY'AIR & SINGTON, THE OFFENDERS (1957);
WEMOFEN, THE URGE To PuNisH, 130-170 (1956);
MENNINGER, TiE HUMAN MIND 443-460 (1945);
WHITE, CRn s AND CRmINALs 157-170 (1933); IvEs,
A HISTORY OF PENAL METHODS (1914); PARSONS,
REsPONSIBILITV FOR CnRam 61 (1909); Overstreet,
Influencing Human Behavior, NPPA YEARBOOK 10, 11
(1932-3).
murder rate,2 but it is not proved which of these
two facts is cause and which is effect. It is claimed
by some that punishment is not only brutal but
also ineffective;3 and every modem criminological
book likes to relate, without analysing the complex
social phenomenon behind the anecdote, the
story of how in England, a century and a half
ago, criminals picked the pockets of the crowds
watching public executions of pickpockets at
Tyburn.
In the attempt to protect the men suffering
from the hands of justice-the criminals-the
shortcomings of the judicial system and of the
police are highlighted, sometimes to such a degree
that respect for justice becomes undermined, very
much as some psychiatrically-oriented literature
dwells on the faults and complexes of parents to
2SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, A REPORT FOR T-
MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF A.L.I. 23-38
(1959); ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIxINAL
ACT AND PUNISMENT 28-29 (1954): WrITE, op. cit.
supra note 1 at 175; Capital Punishment, 1 ARcH.
Cans. PsYcHoDYN~slcs 963 (1955).
3 Barnes, Shall We Get Tough or Be Sensible in Facing
the Increase of Crime?, 23 FED. PRom. 29 (1959); Bran-
cale, Diagnostic Techniques in Aid of Sentencing, 23
LAW & CONTENM. PROB. 442 (1958); Guttmacher, The
Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction, 23 LAW
AND CONTEmP. PROD. 632, 641 (1958); Waite, The Legal
Approach to Crimne and Correction, 23 LAW & CoNTEN2.
PROB. 594, 595-96 (1958); ZILDOORG, op. cit. supra note
2 at 77; ABRA AMSEN, WHo ARE TE GUILTY? (1952);
SUTHERLAND, PINCLEvS OF CRMNOLOGY 355-378
(1942); Karpman, Crime, Insanity and the Law, 39 J.
CRIm. L. & C. 584 (1949). See also the position of Dr.
Karpman at the 1960 American Psychiatric Association
Convention, Time Magazine, May 28, 1960, pp. 72, 75.
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such a degree that their self-esteem and authority
are undermined.
Then, again, it is stated with little clinical
proof that offenders have an unconscious wish for
punishment, and somewhat illogically this is
used as an argument against the use of punish-
ment; criminals are called "sick," without a
definition of this layman's term, and it is claimed
that they are "in need of treatment rather than of
punishment," when it is hard to find psychiatrists
ready to take them for treatment.4 There are
many more contradictory, half-proved, emotional
arguments current that obscure and evade the
fundamental issues. Some of these issues are:
Is a social system without punishment feasible?
Does the concept of punishment and reward
reflect a social and moral philosophy?
What is the purpose of punishment a d its
optimum application; which are the factors in-
herent in and supplementary to punishment that
make it effective?
Has punishment a constructive as well as a
deterrent effect? Has it a legitimate function in
upbringing?
The confusion alluded to previously is partly
due to semantics. The word "punishment" has
bad connotations; "punitive" and "rigid" are the
most condemnatory expressions in the vocabulary
of an "enlightened" person, while "justice" has a
noble sound; yet there can be no justice without
punishment. Suffering is regarded as necessary
and unavoidable to one undergoing psycho-
therapy, and nobody ever thinks of a therapist
as being motivated by conscious or unconscious
sadism; but suffering inflicted in upbringing5 or in
the process of justice is regarded entirely differ-
ently, and the unconscious motives of parents and
judges are carefully scrutinized.
The fact that individuals have given up their
right to private vengeance and vested it in the
jurisdiction of the state, with the state having
taken over the right and duty to protect its
members and to punish and restrain offenders,
4 Schwarz and Ruggieri, Morbid Parent-Child Pas-
sions in Delinquency, 3 J. SocIAL THiEx 180 (1957),
reprinted in GLuEcK, T~aE PROBLEM oF DELINQUENCY
143-152 (1959); Gardiner, The Purposes of Punishment,
21 MOD. L. REv. 221, 229 (1958); Abrahamsen, Family
Tension, Bask Cause of Criminal Behavior, 40 J. GRM
L. & C. 330 (1949).
GFarrell, Fastov, Schmideberg & Schwartz, The
Lack of Facilities for Psychiatric Treatment, in The
Psychiatric Treatment of Offenders (a report in summary
of a Conference of Rehabilitation and Therapy), 15
NEw YoRx MEDICn No. 24 (1959).
has always been regarded as a fundamental step
forward in cultural development and in the co-
hesion and formation of society.6 Dispensing
justice is regarded as one of the most important
sovereign rights of the state, and without justice
and order, society would disintegrate.
It has been taken for granted, ever since the
dawn of history, that punishments and rewards
motivate people and regulate behavior. In bar-
baric societies, men are ruled mainly by fear, physi-
cal or superstitious, but even in such societies
there is some social cohesion and motivation.
Enlightened and civilized countries ever since the
Greeks have tried to develop a social or religious
ideology that supplements the fear of the law,
but it would be unrealistic to assume that ideals
could ever supplant it.
With ,increased prosperity and the spread of
education, and with the improvement of the lot
of the poorest, motives for lawbreaking stemming
from sheer primitivity and dire poverty have been
largely eliminated. A higher cultural level and
the democratic tradition go hand in hand with a
more widespread respect for the law, and because
people are more sensitized, even milder punish-
ments have become more effective, and con-
structive measures help to rehabilitate offenders
and prevent recidivism. Better law-enforcement
and greater certainty of offenders' being brought
to trial endow even mild punishments with greater
deterrent value. The degree to which citizens can
be made to obey the law without resort to judicial
brutality is a measure of civilization and democ-
racy.
Proud as we may be of our achievement when
we compare both the lawlessness and the judicial
brutality of a thousand years ago with today, it
would be unrealistic to assume that we will ever
be able to dispense with law-enforcement and
punishment. The next aim is to render existing
punishments more effective; in other words, to
have fewer lawbreakers, and less recidivism. In
present-day America the stress will have to be,
for quite some time to come, on the reduction of
criminality rather than on reduction of the severity
or frequency of penalties.
6 Guttmacher, op. cit. supra note 3 at 639-40;
WEmoFEN, op. cit. supra note 1 at 28-29; ABRAHAM-
SEN, op. cit. supra note 3, also Cpmm AND Tm HUMr
MIND (1944); VoLD, THEORETICAL CRhmoToOGY 119
(1958); ALExmaDER, Fu .rmNrrAzs or DiAGNosis
238 (1948); FRIEDLANDER, THE PsycHoANALYnc AP-
PROACH TO JuvENILE DELINQUENCY (1947); Fioin,
EscAPE FROM FREEDO0 (1941).
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The concept of punishment and reward implies
a belief in right and wrong, in free will and re-
sponsibility. Here again, however, we are up
against a semantic dichotomy. "Democracy" and
"responsibility" are "good" words, and the average
citizen still believes in right and wrong; however,
modem psychiatry idealizes a "non-judgmental
attitude," though it admits at the same time. that
values are essential both for the mental stability
of the individual and for the cohesion of society.
The problem is, how can you have values without
judging? It is inherently impossible to have values
and ideals without deprecating what falls short
of them. What, then, is so bad about judging?
This is one more example of the semantic bias:
"judgmental" is bad, but "developing a reality
sense" is good. Yet what is "reality sense" if not
the ability to judge and to act rationally on our
judgment? We are perfecting our ability to judge
all through life. This is what maturation consists
of.
The fear of being judgmental reflects the present
ideal of being a "nice guy" at any cost, the wish
to be tolerant and enlightened, in contrast to the
Victorian ideal of the "righteous man." Also, deep
down we all find restraint irksome, and hence we
have unconscious sympathy with lawbreakers and
with attempts to belittle morality.
The trend to be nonjudgmental emanates in
part from psychoanalysis. While it is obviously
impossible to apply psychoanalysis to society or
to human relations wholesale, some overenthus-
iasts have tried to apply certain ingredients of
psychoanalysis indiscriminately, often with un-
fortunate results. For example, there is a current
tendency, though Freud himself would have
disapproved of it, to discredit moral values in
order to gain the illusion of being liberal, enlight-
ened and "objective." Yet, even in the very
limited, carefully regulated analytic situation
applied to carefully selected patients, it is im-
possible to remain "nonjudgmental" over a long
period; so how can such an attitude be transferred
to life? We can as little exist without moral values
as ignore gravity.
One reason why we are up against so many
semantic fallacies and confusions in these areas
is that we are still in the throes of an intellectual
rebellion against nineteenth century concepts and
morality without having sifted and evaluated the
intellectual developments, with all their contra-
dictions, of the last fifty years.' The twentieth
century "rebels" have become righteous, well-
established and dogmatic and, in the course of
establishing themselves, they have used many
emotional appeals and cliches which will have to
be reexamined.
When we come to the question of free will and
responsibility, the situation is particularly uneasy.
It is vaguely believed, though rarely stated in so
many words, and certainly not by Freud, that
because our behavior and reactions are determined
by unconscious factors, there is no free will. This
is a very poor argument. Obviously our behavior
is conditioned by our background and upbringing,
physical constitution, health, social environment,
etc.; but the fact that volition is affected by a
multitude of factors, conscious and unconscious,
mental, physical, and social, does not disprove the
importance of volition as such. Actually, the
problem of volition is perhaps the most neglected
area in modem psychodynamics;8 however, the
fact that theory neglects it does not make it
unimportant.
No society could exist without its members
taking responsibility. As a matter of fact, to do so
is considered by most psychiatrists a hallmark of
maturity. Free will, on the other hand, because of
its associations with a religious or other morality,
has been steadily attacked by anti-moralists in the
last fifty years. But "free will" itself implies the
ability to decide and to take responsibility!
To take responsibility presupposes th6 ability
to make a choice, to decide upon one course of
action and to take the consequences. Admittedly,
the ability to take responsibility, to exercise
judgment and act upon it, may be temporarily or
permanently hampered by a variety of factors,
physical or mental. However, the assumption that
every adult is responsible for his actions, except
under special circumstances, must remain the
cornerstone of any social system,9 and the aim of
psychotherapy or any type of rehabilitation is to
make the offender more responsible and more
sensitive to social levers.
7Schmideberg, Out of the Mouths of Children, 3 J.
APTO No. 3 (1959); Schmideberg, Training for Re-
sponsibility, 12 Pa DELTA KAPPAw No. 3 (1959).
Schnideberg, A Major Task of Therapy: Developing
Volition and Purpose, AwER. J. op PsYcaOTHERAPy
(1961).
9 Farrell Teen-Age Crime in Modern Society, CoR-
REcmioN (July-August 1958); Schmideberg, Further
Comments on the Law and Psychiatry, Comcnor
(March-April 1959); Farrell and Schmideberg, Psy-
chiatry and the Law, op. cit. supra note 5 at 36, 38.
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Punishment is purposefully inflicted physical or
mental hurt or social degradation by constituted
authority in order to discourage lawbreaking 0 The
psychological effect of punishment is not simply
in arithmetic proportion to its painfulness (unless
perhaps when it is excessively brutal) but derives
largely from the fact that it represents society's
condemnation. Injury in wartime or as a result of
an accident may be more painful, but it has a
different effect from punishment meted out by the
courts, because the latter mobilizes inculcated
moral and social values.
The purpose of punishment is to control law-
breaking, both short-term and long-telin, in both
the offender and others, and to reassert the validity
of the social rules which have been violated. The
ideal punishment is one that achieves a maximum
effect in a large number of cases with a minimum
of brutality. For instance, if probation gets as
good results as prison, then probation is pre-
ferable, being less hurtful to the offender and
cheaper to the community. However, if its re-
sults are significantly lower, then more prison
sentences should be given. Actually, probation is
accepted by most probationers merely as the
lesser evil to prison, and its efficacy presupposes
the existence of prisons. For this reason, pro-
bation, with the majority of offenders, is more
effective than a system of voluntary social work.
This consideration indicates that we cannot judge
the effect of a particular type of punishment in
isolation. Rather, we must consider it in the context
of the whole social and judicial fabric. One patient
who received a severe sentence the first time came
out outraged, determined to have his revenge;
the second time, he left prison a hardened offender;
but after the third sentence-ten years-he was
determined to make good, because he realized he
was the loser.
For purposes of this discussion we should
distinguish between fear of pain, and reaction to
social disapproval. The impulse is to avoid what
causes pain; to withdraw the hand from a hot oven
is instinctive. This can be observed even in ani-
mals. Freud named this rule of action the "pleasure
pain principle" and regarded it as the most funda-
mental human reaction." Yet here we find another
inconsistency; Freud's American adherents seem
10 Rosenberg, When is Punishment Effective? (sum-
mary of a conference on Psychiatry and Crime), 3 J.
APTO No. 2 (1959).
1 FREUn, BEYOND TH P.EASURE PRINCIPLE
(Hogarth Press, London, 1922).
to regard an unconscious need for punishment as a
fundamental driving force in offenders and neu-
rotics, if not in everybody,n yet they have not
discarded the primacy of the "pleasure pain
principle."
The reaction to punishment is built upon the
primitive reflex to pain. Properly, during up-
bringing the child should have firmly established
in his mind the associative link "bad behavior...
punishment" and should learn that he has to
avoid the former in order to avoid the latter. By
this process the child learns self-control, dis-
cipline, forethought and responsibility and is
sensitized to social disapproval. These qualities,
which should be established during upbringing,
are later utilized by society in its handling of
offenders. Failure to establish these qualities in
the child is the most frequent cause of antisocial
behavior. Children who obey their parents and
show consideration for members of their family
are likely to obey the courts and show considera-
tion for society. If this fundamental social attitude
is poorly developed, it is the task of probation and
rehabilitation to encourage it.
Punishment is not invariably effective, partly
because the child's impulse to be naughty or his
defiance overcomes his fear, and partly because
his forethought is still insufficiently developed. He
wants to evade responsibility. "My hand did it."
"Oh, that was when I was still a baby." (Even
when it was yesterday.)
For the adult offender, this wish to avoid
responsibility and the consequences of his behavior
by the use of denial mechanisms is characteristic.
They help him to believe that he will escape
punishment or even that he has not really done
wrong. For the threat of punishment to be effect-
ive, the offender must fully believe that he will be
punished; he may refuse to believe it, whether for
objective reasons-law enforcement is lax, justice
is corrupt, etc.-or for subjective ones-in order
to feel free to commit crimes. The objective and
subjective factors are usually intertwined. We all
try to avoid facing unpleasant facts and possi-
bilities, but excessive denial mechanisms are
characteristic of the offender and in particular of
the psychopath. Give him an inch of objective
shortcoming and he will take a yard of excuses.
Law enforcement may be poor, there may be
12 E.g., Karpman, Criminal Psychodynamics: A
Platform, 1 ARcn. Caim. PsYcaoDn NAmcs 3-100
(1955); Segal, Searchlights on Delinqueny, 1 AR cH.
CMs. PsYcHoDvNAmcs 577-603 (1955).
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corruption, but that does not mean that he will
escape; there are many injustices and faults in our
society, but that does not mean that he is innocent.
When offenders blame society, the difficulty in
finding employment, the ill effects of prison,
discrimination against Negroes, they are utilizing
"neutralizing" mechanisms1e 3 that help them to
deny that the fault lies within themselves, and
they will use the argument that appeals to their
listeners or that bears out the favorite theory of
the investigator.
Society, for reasons of humanity and also of
economy, wants the threat of punishment to be
effective, so that punishment will not have to be
inflicted in every case. Thus, in education, re-
ligion and therapy the attempt is made to break
down the denial mechanisms that make the
offender immune, in order to sensitize him to
warnings. Probation utilizes the emotional turmoil
caused by arrest and trial, which breaks through
the offender's defenses, to establish a relation.
Not even the most autocratic society is ruled
by force alone; it provides an ideology and appeals
to loyalty to the ruler, religion (or Communism),
patriotism, and above all to a sense of justice.
Belief in justice is among the most stabilizing
social forces, and if the offender has good cause to
doubt the justification of his punishment he will
try to make himself immune to it. He tries anyhow
to deny or minimize his own guilt, while society
tries to counter his denial mechanisms by im-
pressing upon him his guilt. In the melodramatic
Middle Ages, a "poor sinner" when taken to
execution recanted his misdeeds, admonished the
spectators and tried to die at peace with God and
society.
Not only "should justice be done, but also it
should be apparent that it is being done." For
this reason, some dignity and formality are de-
sirable, since it is better to impress offenders with
the dignity of the court than to have to take
recourse to brutality. For punishment to be
effective, there must be a belief in justice, and for
that reason it is important that in any fight to
modify legislation, to improve justice or the
police, or to gain psychiatric treatment or re-
habilitation for offenders, the change should not
be sought in such a way as to undermine belief in
the law or to excuse lawbreaking.
The average citizen accepts punishment for
1Ohlin, Wizen is Punishment Effective?, oP. cit. supra
note 10.
lawbreaking as part of the social code. Though he
does not like it when it concerns himself, he admits
its justification. He will carefully weigh whether
it is worth his while to break the law. He is afraid
of punishment and will say so, and if he incurs it,
he is upset, frightened, ashamed and disturbed.
Thus the infliction of punishment on the average
citizen has the effect desired by society, inasmuch
as he will avoid committing further offenses unless
there are overwhelming circumstances.
In contrast to this hypothetical average man,
however, most offenders are not affected by
punishment in the right way.14 This is most
obvious in the case of repeaters, but in a social
sense almost every offender is a repeater because
even though legally he may be a first offender, he
has usually already been in trouble with his
family, school, employer, or store detectives, and
he has failed to learn his lesson.
One of the most striking things about offenders
is that they do not believe they will ever be
caught or brought to justice. Even after going to
jail, many believe they will never be caught again.
They have a magical belief in their own cleverness,
luck, or whatever they call it--often in obvious
contrast to the facts. One patient expressed to me,
as an explanation for committing his offenses, his
"sense of gloating" that he got away. I said,
somewhat amazed, "But you did not get away,
you got arrested several times." In his mind he
had managed to deny the fact of the arrests and
dwelt only on the occasions when he had escaped.
The extent of these denial mechanisms is some-
times truly amazing, and to counter them is one
of the aims of therapy.16 Of course, any weakness
in the judicial system, any occasion where the
patient did get away, helps to strengthen his
denial tendencies. An offender may succeed with
the most amazing bluff just because of its very
141 am disregarding the openly psychotic patient
who is "guilty but insane," who does not live suffi-
ciently in reality to be aware of and rationally influ-
enced by his environment, who is ruled more by his
delusions than by fear of punishment. However, even
most psychotics are to some degree influenced by the
way they are being treated, but they do not have the
strength to act normally even if they fear punishment.
Psychotically deluded offenders or patients of such low
mentality that they really do not know what they are
doing constitute a minimal fraction of offenders, and
present no real criminological problem since they be-
long in mental institutions.
15 Schmideberg, Treating the Serious Offender, 1 3.
APTO No. 1 (1957); Schmideberg, Treating the Unwill-
ing Patient, 9 BRiT. J. or DELInQuENcY 117 (1958);
Schmideberg, Making the Patient Aware, J. NPPA
(1960).
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brazenness, and such success increases his sense
of omnipotence and narcissism. Upbringing and
community attitudes increase or counter these
trends by encouraging or discouraging narcissism,
denial of consequences, and belief in one's ability
to get away. Fear of God's omniscience and of
eternal punishment reinforces the fear of the law;
so does the inculcating of moral standards, the
developing of self control, and impressing on the
child the justification and likelihood of punish-
ment.
The fact that religious and authoritarian com-
munities also have crime is no argument against
the effectiveness of these inhibiting factors, since
other factors exist to counter them. Behavior is the
end result of a multitude of factors, social and
individual, positive and negative. But on the whole,
glorifying lawbreakers and the defiance of au-
thority, giving publicity to the offense rather than
to the punishment, and promoting the ideal of
success at any cost are more likely to produce
lawbreaking than are ideals of law obedience and
submission.
The claim of many offenders that they do not
really mind jail is largely based on denial mech-
anisms. With recidivists it is often difficult to
elicit any emotion, yet the most-effective way to
evoke it is by appealing to their fear of court and
prison. Sometimes a patient claims that he does
not mind prison ("it isn't as bad as all that"), and
that he has gotten used to it. But, if I succeed in
taking him by surprise, for instance by getting
him to talk about the particular prison he has
been in, or some particularly unpleasant incident
in it, he usually shows a strong reaction. A patient
with a number of convictions claimed that she
did not mind jail. Then she got arrested again and
I visited her in prison. I was amazed to see how
distraught and broken she was. I told her, "You
said you didn't mind prison." She answered, "I
must have forgotten what it was like." It reminds
me of the London blitz when people would remi-
nisce about their various funny escapes. However,
when a bomb had hit their own or their neighbor's
house, they were usually pretty well shaken.
In the same way that he attempts to avoid his
actual feelings about imprisonment, the criminal
tries to overcome and deny anxiety. Many
offenders have told me that what frightens them
most is the experience of anxiety and more still to
let others witness it. An ex-Dartmoor convict had
a nightmare that he was back in prison; but what
frightened him most was that he experienced
terror when he awoke, since this made him vul-
nerable. 16
Thus we have to distinguish: 1) Fear of punish-
ment; 2) Admitting this fear to oneself; 3) Ad-
mitting this fear to others; 4) Acting rationally on
this fear.
The reluctance to admit it to oneself is to some
degree a question of self-esteem. Many psycho-
paths take senseless risks to prove they aren't
"chicken."
The offender is reluctant to admit his fear to
others because he does not want others to have an
emotional hold over him, which they would then
exploit to socialize him.
The offender's attitude toward punishment
differs from that of the ordinary citizen in that he
is not normally deterred or influenced by the
possibility of punishment. Though it is often
believed-and he himself likes to claim it-that
he is unaffected by punishment, he is actually
afraid of it. But he manages to deny his fear, and
therefore it fails to socialize him. The "hardened"
criminal is one who has succeeded in blocking out
his anxiety, so that he is not amenable to normal
social pressures.
The issue under discussion is complicated by the
fact that punishment-in our social system,
usually jail-is a complex phenomenon; it is a
social disgrace for those still trying to belong to
society, while the others do not care. Physical
discomfort, fear of fellow prisoners, and separation
from family cause unhappiness to those who art.
still to some degree socialized, while to those on
the lowest level, prison provides a roof and se-
curity. Some offenders are just resigned to prison
and used to it as a mode of life. A patient who
spent many years in jail told me that when he was
in prison he would wake up in the middle of the
night with a nightmare, dreaming that.he tried to
escape, and was greatly relieved to find that he
was in his own cell. This was not "wish for punish-
ment" but fear of being on the run.
There are many reasons why patients may wish
to be back in prison: they have spent a large part
of their lives there; they have formed attachments
there; they "know the ropes" and in prison they
can avoid the struggles and disappointments of free
life.
The "unconscious wish for punishment" has
16 Schmideberg and Sokol, Insensitization in Aa
Psychopathic Personaiity, 1 J. APTO No. 2 (1957).
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become a cliche, glibly used in place of thoughtful
explanation. 7 Criminals do not have an over-strict
conscience which may demand being punished;
rather, they have an insufficiently developed
conscience.
If a neurotic has a strong need for punishment
he can find many ways of causing himself pain, but
his conscience will stop him from breaking the law
in any serious manner. It is unfortunate that a
theoretical confusion has arisen between the
neurotic character, on the one hand, and the
anti-social personality or the psychopath on the
other. These types are opposites and require
different handling.' 8 The main reason why
offenders break the law is that they want to
commit crimes, because they are anti-social, and
because they hope not to get caught. The fact
that they do sometimes get caught does not prove
that they wish to get caught; but with a minimum
efficiency of law enforcement this is inevitable if
they commit offenses frequently enough.
There may be many reasons why, in the com-
mission of a crime, elementary precautions are not
taken, and the likelihood of getting caught thus
increases. As a matter of fact, even a law-abiding
person may have many reasons for poor work
performance or for failing to look when he crosses
the street. It may be anything from over-tiredness,
a physical defect, emotional defiance or "testing
luck," to an unconscious denial of danger, a failure
to think rationally, or a tendency to concentrate
on some details and overlook others.
The assumption that offenders break the law
because of an unconscious wish for punishment
seems to me unsubstantiated and too general an
explanation. It would, however, even if correct,
be no argument to abolish punishment or even to
17 Salzman, What is the Evidence for the Assumption
that Offenders are Motivated by an Unconscious Wish for
Punishment? 3 J. APTO No. 3 (1959).
3 Dept. of Clinical Services, APTO, Differences
Between the Offender and the Neurotic, 15 NEw YoRK
MVEDicnm No. 24 at 20-22 (1959); Plutchik, Implica-
tions of a Neurosis-Delinquency Continuum, 3 3. APTO
No. 1 (1959); Jenkins, Distinguishing Two Major
Types of Delinquents, 4 J. APTO No. 1 (1959).
avoid it in the case of the individual offender.
Punishment may or may not deter. If there is
efficient law enforcement and a belief in justice,
mostly it does. The aim of psychotherapyw is to
sensitize the offender to social pressure, to develop
a normal attitude toward punishment, and to
teach him to foresee consequences and be moti-
vated rationally by such foresight. The aim is to
adjust him to the legal framework, not to take the
framework away.
There are many offenders who are sufficiently
afraid of punishment, yet who cannot go straight.
Normal life consists of more than the mere de-
cision to avoid crime. If a man is unable to earn
his living he Will ultimately have no choice but
to break the law, no matter how much he may
dread the consequences. He may be untrained,
unused to working, unwilling to work, psycho-
logically unable to work, or unable to get a job as
an ex-convict. Recidivism is a complex phenome-
non, due largely to an unwillingness or an in-
ability to lead a social life.
An important task of psychotherapy is to give
constructive help to offenders to counter the
feelings of helplessness and despair which largely
account for their anti-social attitudes, and to help
them adjust socially. The effectiveness of punish-
ment in the avoidance of recidivism will be greatly
enhanced by combining punishment with con-
structive rehabilitative measures. Punishment is
not necessarily an alternative to rehabilitation or
psychotherapy; rather, it is often a necessary
incentive.
"1 Schmideberg and Orr, Psychiatric Treatment of
Offenders, 43 MENTAL HyGrENE No. 3 (1959); Sclmide-
berg, The Treatment Philosophy of APTO, 3 J. APTO
No. 1 "(1959); Schmideberg, Psychiatric Stdy and
Psychotherapy of Criminals, 5 PROGESS iN PsycHo-
TaERAPY (1960); Ochroch, The Treatment of Offenders:
Special Therapeutic Techniques, 15 NEw Yox MEDi-
cuma No. 24 (1959); Ochroch, Special Difficulties in
Working with Adolescent Offenders, 3 3. APTO Nos. I
and 2 (1959); Dept. of Clinical Services, APTO,
Criminal Psychiatry as a Sub-Specialty, 15 NEw Youx
MEDicrNE No. 24 at 22 and 33 (1959); Dept. of Clinical
Services, APTO, Differences Between the Offender and
the Neurotic, 15 NEw Yoax MEDicrNE No. 24 at 20-22
(1959).
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